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Abstract
This article examines the effect of social networks through the use of family, friends or
relatives ties on quality of employment (QoE). Drawing from the socioeconomic literature
on social networks and labor market, we propose an original and multidimensional measure
of QoE, and a fruitful estimation approach of the effect of social networks on QoE that
allows to deal with complex inter-groups heterogeneity. Using the Great Integrated Housh-
old Survey (GIHS) and a sample on Bogota’s workers in 2013, we find evidence proving
that the use of ties has high negative effects on QoE index for those who are in the lower
quality of employment range. Likewise, the use of social networks has very low negative
effects on QoE index for individuals who are in the better quality of employment range.
Complemented by focus groups interviews, these empirical results raise questions about
the difference prevailing in relational practices between necessity networks for precarious
workers and opportunity networks for protected workers.
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1 Introduction
Jobs and quality of employment are important challenges facing de-
veloping countries (DCs) for their structural transformation (World
Bank 2013; OECD 2016; McMillan et al. 2014). Since the 1980s, the
context of increasing globalization, urbanization and political muta-
tions made it difficult to characterize urban labor market dynamics.
However, a proper grasp of this social sphere is crucial to efficiently
orient public policies of employment.
In a socioeconomic perspective, to understand the dynamics of labor
markets it is essential to analyze the social and institutional processes
in which individuals and markets are embedded (Smelser and Swed-
berg 2005). Since Granovetter’s seminal study (1974), sociological and
economic literatures have emphasized on the importance of social net-
works in market functioning and in individual behaviors (Rauch and
Casella 2001; Jackson 2014). This relational embeddedness of eco-
nomic actions means that abstracting from social interactions comes
with the risk of severely misunderstanding behaviors and their causes
(Granovetter 1985). In fact, designing many economic policies requires
a deep understanding of social relations and network effects (Jackson
et al. 2017). In developed labor markets, researches on informal con-
tacts show that a major part of jobs and activities are obtained or
developed through family, friends or relatives (Petersen et al. 2000;
Topa 2011). A fortiori, these issues are crucial in DCs which are char-
acterized by formal institutions failing to channel information about
market opportunities in which social networks are employed frequently
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for job search1 (Fafchamps 2006). Relational embeddedness plays an
important but also ambiguous role in determining various labor mar-
ket outcomes (Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004; Datcher Loury 2006;
Pasquier-Doumer 2013; Bramoullé et al. 2016; Nguyen and Nordman
2017).
Some theoretical and empirical studies argue that social networks gen-
erate opportunities and are a good channel for the transmission of job
information for job-seekers or employees. For unemployed workers, the
use of ties may reduce the duration dependence on the exit rates out
of unemployment (Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2005; Bramoullé and
Saint-Paul 2010). Kramarz and Skans (2014) indicate that parental
ties are an important determinant of how Swedish young workers find
and progress in their job. In the United-States, Hispanic men report
more frequent use of friends and relatives for job search than non-
Hispanic, and found their more recent job through personal networks
(Smith 2000). In DCs, Magruder (2010) demonstrates that using the
father’s networks has a positive effect on the son’s employment in
South African context. In India, Beaman and Magruder (2012) pro-
vide evidence that some workers, those with high skill levels, have
useful information about the abilities of members of their social net-
work. In the same way, Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2015) indi-
cate that social networks seem to influence the probability to get a
job when individuals are unemployed in Burkina Faso. Regarding the
positive effect of social networks on earnings, Calvó-Armengol and
1For example in Colombia, the National Employment Agency was established
in the last trimester of 2013, Law 1636 of 18 June 2013 and the decree 2521 of 15
November 2013.
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Jackson (2004) demonstrate theoretically that the higher the wages
of contacts, the more information they are willing to give to others.
They also show that individuals are more likely to earn higher if their
contacts are located in more extensive networks and are employed
(Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2007). Some empirical studies prove
these results and show that those who found their job through fam-
ily, friends and relatives earned more than those using formal meth-
ods in the United States (Kugler 2003). Antoninis (2006) observes
that new recruits receive a higher starting wage when recommended
by an individual with direct experience in the sector. Other authors
have documented the positive correlation between the use of ties and
the small-business performances in the West African context or the
poverty reduction in China (Nguyen and Nordman 2017; Zhang et al.
2017).
However, the social networks also produce negative effects for specific
types of workers on the labor markets. If social ties are a good channel
to receive new informations on the market opportunities, Brady (2015)
precises that this effect varies by location, sociodemographic charac-
teristics and types of relations. Some studies argue that those using
contacts earned less than those using formal ways or had no persis-
tent wage effects (Bentolila et al. 2010). In DCs, Antoninis (2006) also
refers the use of referrals from friends and relatives has no effect on the
starting wage and may even be negatively related to wages of workers
in unskilled jobs in Egyptian context. Marques (2012) shows that rela-
tional settings strongly influence individuals access to markets, lead-
ing some Brazilian people into worse living conditions and poverty.
In Malawi, Beaman et al. (2017) also show that men systematically
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refer few women, despite being able to refer qualified Indian women
when explicitly asked for female candidates. Mano et al. (2011) show
that workers in Ethiopia’s cut flower industry who were recruited in-
formally using social ties were paid less than the formally-recruited
workers. Moreover, social capital and kinship ties may not be a useful
predictor of success for small-scale fisheries and can produce a redis-
tributive pressure (forced solidarity) for small business (Nguyen and
Nordman 2017; Crona et al. 2016). The risk of over–embeddedness is
also developed by Berrou and Combarnous (2012) who demonstrate
that informal entrepreneurs have to combine strong and weak ties of
social support and business relations to be successful in Burkina Faso.
They also indicate that the proportion of network members with a high
social status has no significant positive impact on economic outcomes,
contrary to more approachable individuals (Berrou and Combarnous
2011).
We identified two main types of networks generating contrasting ef-
fects on the labor market. As we saw before, these differential effects
are correlated with the heterogeneity and the multi-segmentation of
labor markets, particularly in DCs (Fields 2011; Günther and Launov
2012; Radchenko 2016). However, the heterogeneity of labor market
outcomes is complex and inevitably comes under a multidimensional
process, mixing social institutions and legal regulations. In this way,
using the quality of employment concept2 seems to be crucial (Burchell
et al. 2014). This multidimensional approach has a considerable inter-
est, allowing precise analysis of employment forms, their further evo-
2See Burchell et al. (2014) for a specific overview on the quality of employment
concept.
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lution and abandoning the classical typologies of the labor markets in
developing context (Floro and Messier 2011; Ramos et al. 2015; Com-
barnous and Deguilhem 2016). In developed countries, few studies
emphasize on the relation between social networks and quality of em-
ployment (Granovetter 1974; Montgomery 1992). But, they offer two
unidimensional measures of job quality, keeping income and job satis-
faction as two fruitless approximations (Sengupta et al. 2009; Bustillo
et al. 2011). In developing countries, Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer
(2015) have documented this issue with an approximation of quality of
employment levels through a dichotomy between self-employment and
wage employment (Bocquier et al. 2010). In Colombia, Combarnous
and Deguilhem (2016) have shown that this typology is not relevant
to deal with the complexity of urban labor markets. Indeed, a clear
break does not exist anymore between quality of employment for em-
ployees and independents, agreeing with the idea of a continuum.
In the Latin-American context, this paper offers to analyze the deter-
minants of quality of employment for workers on urban labor markets
by emphasizing on the role played by the use of social networks. We
examine the effects of social ties on quality of employment for two
groups of workers by answering the following questions. Do social
contacts help to increase the quality of current job for vulnerable and
protected workers? Do we observe a similar effect of social networks
on quality of employment for the lower and higher quality job work-
ers? What are the differences between social practices of both workers
groups?
We display original results and introduce a four-fold contribution to
the line of research that investigates urban labor markets in Latin
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America. First, we combine a representative sample of employed per-
sons in Bogota’s labor market, produced by the Colombian Great In-
tegrated Household Survey (GIHS) in 2013, with focus groups inter-
views to capture precisely the diversity of social practices. Second,
an original methodology is formulated to construct an index of thir-
teen variables corresponding to the six interconnected dimensions of
the quality of employment concept. Third, dealing with complex inter-
groups heterogeneity, we offer an accurate estimation of the differential
effects of the use of social networks on the strong and poor quality jobs.
Fourth, we found that the use of ties has a general negative impact on
the quality of employment, whatever the position of the individual in
the labor market. However, this effect is clearly more pronounced for
the individuals with low quality of employment and much lower for
those with better quality job. From these observations, and thanks
to the focus groups, we discuss the distinction between necessity net-
works and opportunity networks in the Bogota’s labor market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional
context of the Bogota’s urban labor market, the data and the focus
groups scheme. Section 3 introduces the method adopted to construct
a relevant QoE index in the Colombian context and summarizes the
estimation strategy. Section 4 displays the empirical results and com-
ments qualitatively the differential effects of social networks for dif-
ferent workers groups. Finally, the last Section discusses the findings
and the methodological approach.
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2 Context and Data
2.1 The Bogota’s urban labor market
In 2013, the city of Bogota had nearly 7.6 million inhabitants, com-
pared to 715,000 in 1951. It now represents nearly 17% of the Colom-
bian population, an 87% increase from 1985. Despite a low birth rate,
and a downward trend in the average annual urbanization rate – going
from 7% between 1950 and 1955 to 1.36% between 2010 and 2015 –
the capital district remains marked by urban transition, arising from
internal migration. It forms a “hub of the territorial system,” host-
ing populations from forced displacements resulting from the internal
conflict (Dureau et al. 2015:35). Faced with expanding informal ur-
banization and growing inequalities, the government implemented a
socio-economic space stratification method in order to introduce a
mixed subsidy mechanism for municipal services payments. Various
homogeneous groups of buildings (6 groups) were established on the
basis of the cadastral zones. These “blocks” of homogeneous residences
give a good approximation of the social hierarchy: the poorest (1, 2
and 3), representing almost 90% of the population in 2013, receive
support for between 40% and 10% of the cost of services, whereas
the richest (5 and 6) pay a surcharge of between 40% and 20%. Since
the introduction of this policy, Bogota has followed an insular, residen-
tially segregated developmental logic, between a northeastern zone oc-
cupied by the wealthiest households, a southern area inhabited by poor
households, and a western area occupied by the middle class (Dureau
et al. 2015:113-114). This social hierarchization directly determines
household location decisions, and influences social group identity in
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access to education, healthcare and employment (SDP 2013). Unlike
other Andean metropolis, Bogota has a relatively low rate of poverty,
at 17% in 2011; it remains high however in the South of the city and
in strata 1 and 2: 40% for strata 1 and 25% for strata 2 (SDP 2013).
As an illustration of this heterogeneous situation, the capital city has
observed a significant increase in income inequality, with the Gini in-
dex for income increasing from 0.51 in 2008 to 0.61 in 2013.3
Alongside these socioeconomic elements, we capture important legal
factors to present precisely the labor market institutions. In 2013, the
monthly minimum wage was 589 500 pesos (Article 145 of the Codigo
Sustantivo de Trabajo, CST), the unemployment insurance contribu-
tion was one month’s salary for each year of service and proportion-
ally for fractions of a year (Article 249 of the CST), social protection,
pension contribution, occupational risks protection, and family fund
contribution are mandatory (Article 10 of the law 1122, Article 7 of
the law 797, Article 3 of the law 789 and Article 13 of the decree 1772).
However, it is only possible to form a local union in companies with
at least 25 employees (Article 359 of the CST, Constitutional Council
decision No. C-201-02 of March 19, 2002). In the Colombian socioe-
conomic context, characterized by the omnipresence of micro-business
and small enterprises, this closes the door, for a large number of work-
ers, to the collective defense of their rights. Moreover, article 416
of the Colombian CST, derived from decree 2663 of 1950, excludes
public-sector employee unions from the right to collective bargaining
3The 2008 Gini index came from Bogota’s Department of District Planning
(SDP 2013). Authors have calculated the 2013 Gini index on the basis of the
2013 household survey.
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and the right to strike. The Constitutional Court did however nuance
the scope of this legislation, public-sector employees have access to the
right of collective bargaining to some extent, but not the right to strike.
In regard to social security, the self-employed do not have, in principle,
access to the Sistema General de Riesgos Laborales (General System
of Occupational Risks Insurance) and an employment contract lasting
at least one month is also required for membership to the occupational
risk coverage system.
2.2 Data
The data comes from the 2013 Great Integrated Household Survey
(GIHS) produced by the National Administrative Department of Statis-
tics. Our analysis covers a representative sample of workers (18-95
years old) who are employed in Bogota’s labor market. As such, work-
ers between 15 and 17 years old are excluded because they do not have
“normal” rights in their working conditions4. Moreover, we excluded
workers working more than 120 hours per week5. Our final sample
consists of 8,855 workers, 5,846 of whom answered the question about
the use of social networks. Due to these missing observations in the
use of networks (34%), the estimation of the QoE mixture equations
is at risk of selection bias. Indeed, some socioeconomic factors can in-
fluence the answer probability, therefore we must correct this selection
bias (Section 3). Socioeconomic covariates were drawn from number
4See, e.g. Delmas et al. (2016).
5120 hours per week is equivalent to more than 17 hours on the workplace,
and some studies, using Time Use Survey, have documented that the biological
time for the reproduction can not be less than 7 hours per day (Hamermesh and
Stancanelli 2015).
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of domains which are relevant in the Bogota’s labor market analysis.
Demographic variables include age, education, gender, marital status
and household variables. Work-related variables include employment
status and firm size.
Moreover, we complement our quantitative approach with focus groups
interviews. Following Crossley et al. (2015:62), “qualitative methods
are useful for investigating unexplored networks; concrete acts, prac-
tices and interactions; actors’ perceptions and assessment of relation-
ships [...].” In other words, with qualitative methods we explore the
content and meaning of relationships, and the meaning of the overall
structure of individual social environments. In 2016, we have coor-
dinated three focus groups sessions6 to get qualitative accounts on
different experiences of getting a job through social networks in Bo-
gota. The objective was to understand how individuals choose where
to seek or who to ask in their job search effort. The main criteria for
structuring the composition of the groups was the balance between the
diversity of information that can be extracted from a heterogeneous
group, and the incentives to express ideas resulting from being part of
a homogeneous group7 (Madriz 1998). We have selected two types of
groups8. The dimension used for considering the homogeneity of the
group was the segment of the labor market in which the members par-
63 sessions of 2 groups of 5 individuals on average. Every discussion in each
group lasted 90 minutes on average. During each discussion, the facilitator co-
ordinates the discussion, the participants provide a narrative of how they got a
job. The relator records the conversation, take notes of the observations from the
participants and marks the time and key discussion moments.
7People are more comfortable talking when they are with their peers.
8The group members have been selected at random in different stations of the
Transmilenio (Bus Rapid Transit System of Bogota) in the center of the city.
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ticipate. The reason for this is that the labor market segmentation is
pretty strong between low and high quality jobs (Delmas et al. 2016).
In addition, this dimension is closely with income and strata, which
summarizes most of the social differences in Colombia.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 The differential effects
We start from the idea of heterogeneity between different social groups
in terms of ex post job quality, so we can distinguish high and low qual-
ity of employment in the labor market (Combarnous and Deguilhem
2016; Delmas et al. 2016). To obtain a job, a worker may have used
different ways with distinct effects depending on his group. In partic-
ular, the use of social networks ex ante can have two effects for the
two heterogeneous groups. Following Rogers and Verhove (1995) and
Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2015), we can distinguish two basic
functions which are specific to the ties:
• Securing and supporting actors with different types of risk in the
labor market. In other words, the networks are seen as an instru-
ment of last resort, characterizing a necessary safety net for the
vulnerable.
• Establish a preferred vehicle for dissemination of information about
the opportunities offered or created. The networks are then con-
sidered as channels facilitating the transmission of information in
the social groups with relations between them, especially in the
wealthier groups.
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Figure 1: Opportunity networks effect
Worker with high QoE
POSITIVE EFFECT POSITIVE EFFECT
Used social net-
works to get the job
Did not use social net-
works to get the job
Figure 2: Necessity networks effect
Worker with low QoE
NEGATIVE EFFECT POSITIVE EFFECT
Used social net-
works to get the job
Did not use social net-
works to get the job
In the first group (high QoE), workers have “good” contacts or
“good” types of relations, and they use them to get a better job. In
this way, using ties do not differ from using formal means on the ex
post quality of employment. These workers have positive externalities
regardless of the way they look for a job. Finally, their ex post QoE
increases in both cases (Figure 1). In this workers group, using ties is
a “good quality job channel” and we call social networks effect: oppor-
tunity networks.
In the second group (low QoE), workers have a specific type of con-
tacts or relations, equal socioeconomic status or strong ties, for exam-
ple, and they use them to get a job at all costs. In this way, the use
of ties differ from formal means on the ex post quality of employment.
Inversely than formal procedures, these workers have negative exter-
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nalities when they use their networks to obtain a job. Finally, their
ex post QoE decreases (Figure 2). In this workers group, using ties
appears as a “bad quality job trap” and we call this social networks
effect: necessity networks.
3.2 The quality of employment index
Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016) demonstrate that the quality of
employment concept must be located in legal and social contexts. De-
spite this necessity, they show that the following six dimensions mark
the “common core” of QoE (Guergoat-Larivière and Marchand 2012;
Burchell et al. 2014): (i) income level, (ii) working conditions and
legal status, (iii) the possibilities of reconciling work and family life,
(iv) social securities, (v) collective employment components, (vi) the
subjective dimension given to the job. Specifically in Latin America,
some studies establish various indicators of quality of employment by
raising the type of contract, social security cover, income and work-
ing time, multiple activities, workplace, employment security and/or
non-wage benefits (Floro and Messier 2011; Farné and Vergara 2015).
Following Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016), we opted for a multi-
variate strategy to formulate the QoE index.9 Faced with the cate-
gorical nature of household survey data, the Multiple Correspondence
Analysis (MCA), with its quite robust (stable, invariant) χ2 metric, is
a more appropriate technique to deal with mixed data. This approach
constitutes an empirical method adapted to construct a contextual-
ized QoE index based on the factorial scores of each category of some
9For a more detailed literature survey on the QoE measurement, see Com-
barnous and Deguilhem (2016).
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indicators of QoE (OECD 2008). In this sense, we assume that the Q
indicators are categorical ordinals and the indicator q having jq cate-
gories.
Let us assume that the first factorial axis meets the consistency con-
ditions to be considered as a quality of employment factor, we can
then define as an appropriate composite indicator: QoE = F1. In
this sense, the QoE index for every worker is calculated from the nor-
malized score of each category of the indicators coming back into the
composition of the first factorial axis of the MCA. We can express the
quality of employment index for the individual i under the following
functional form:
QoEi =
∑q
q=1
∑jq
jq=1
W
1,qj
q K
q
i,jq
Q
(1)
Where Q corresponds to the number of categorical indicators, W 1,qjq =
w1,qjq√
κ1
is the normalized category-score jq of the indicator q on the first
factorial axis κ1. Kqi,jq is a binary variable, taking a value of 1 when
the individual i presents the category jq, 0 otherwise.
The value of the QoE index corresponds well to the normalized category-
score average on the first factorial axis of the MCA. We have : QoEi ∈
[−1; 1] that we brought back into [0; 1] by linear interpolation, in or-
der to make reading easier. Then, we have a continuous QoE index:
QoEi ∈ [0; 1], with 0 corresponding to the worst possible job quality,
and 1 corresponding to the best possible QoE in this social context.
According to the socioeconomic description of Bogota’s labor market,
we have therefore selected 13 socioeconomic and legal ex post vari-
ables to build this QoE index (Appendix A1). Using this selection,
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we can analyze Bogota’s urban labor market in the clearest and most
accurate way possible.
3.3 Finite Mixture Regression Model (FMRM)
This approach simultaneously allows to identify heterogeneous groups
and to estimate each specific regression model (this econometric strat-
egy is derived from Conway and Deb 2005; Deb and Trivedi 2013; Deb
et al. 2011). This procedure consists of three successive stages.
Stage 1: Number of components
Before starting the Finite Mixture Regression Model, it is necessary
to check that the sample contains a sufficient number of observations
to support partitioning, various studies suggest a minimum of n = 30
per group (Garver et al. 2008). In addition, we must start from the
premise that the number of groups is less than the number of ob-
servations, which is to capture a “unobserved heterogeneity between
groups” rather than between individuals (Salem and Bensidoun 2012;
Frühwirth-Schnatter et al. 2012).
When applying a FMRM, the number of groups is not known and
must therefore be inferred from our data. Choosing the number of
components C can then be carried out with different methods, de-
pending on which has placed a greater interest in the quality of the
adjustment of density or in the detection of distinct groups (McLach-
lan and Peel 2000). Thus, if the main interest concerns the estimation
of density, proper method is to select the value C which minimizes the
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AIC (Akaike 1974) and the BIC (Schwarz 1978):
• AIC = −2Lˆ+ 2K
• BIC = −2Lˆ+ (3K − 1)log(n)
Where Lˆ is the estimator of the log-likelihood, n is the number of
observations and K corresponds to the number of estimated parame-
ters. Ultimately, then we must choose the model that minimizes the
absolute values of AIC and BIC.
Stage 2: Specification of the FMRM
The linear regression model is to specify the conditional expectation
of a dependent variable, the QoE index, as a linear function of the use
of ties (SNW ) and different explanatory variables.10 One approach
is to specify in a same way the average of the density functions of
each of the mixture groups. If we consider a finite mixture of the nor-
mal distributions (with the variance values σ2c ), we can formulate the
equation in order to obtain a finite mixture regression model :
f(QoE|SNW,X; Θ) =
C∑
c=1
picφ(SNW, β
c
1)fc(QoE|X; βc2, µc, σc) (2)
Where Θ is the set of parameters, C represents the number of compo-
nents, pic is the proportion of the population included in C, φ(.) corre-
sponds to the density of the Gaussian distribution, βc1 is the parameter
associated with the variable SNW (explaining the proportions within
10We use three types of explanatory variables: individual (education, gender,
marital status, Age), household (apartment, socioeconomic stata) and employ-
ment characteristics (activy sector). For more variable details, see Appendix B1.
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the mixture model), βc2 the set of parameters associated with the set
of explanatory variables X, µc is the expectation of the distribution
and σc is the variance in each component.
The average of the densities are no longer estimated parameters, they
are now conditional on the values of our variable of interest SNW and
other explanatory variables X. They are obtained from the model
estimation. Looking at two components (C = 2), we consider the
following Gaussian mixture model:
C1: QoE1i = β
1
0 + SNW
1
i β
1
1 +X
1
i β
1
2 + 
1
i
C2: QoE2i = β
2
0 + SNW
2
i β
2
1 +X
2
i β
2
2 + 
2
i
 (3)
C1: 1i ∼ N(0, σ2i 1)
C2: 2i ∼ N(0, σ2i 2)
 (4)
Where 1i et 2i are independent error terms, identically distributed fol-
lowing a normal distribution with their respective variances σ2i
1 and
σ2i
2.
This analysis would be fine if the missing QoE index data were missing
completely at random. However, the decision to answer at the social
networks question or not (in the questionnaire), is not randomly dis-
tributed (Appendix B1). Thus, those who did not answer constitute
a self-selected sample and not a random sample. It is likely that some
of the individuals that should be in specific situations choose not to
answer and this would account for much of the missing QoE data.
Thus, it is likely that we will under estimate the QoE of these individ-
uals in the population. Finally, in the sample we have a first type of
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decisions that creates selectivity (i.e., individual selection), Figure 3
illustrates the sample selection problem. We resolve that issue by us-
ing the Heckman’s two-step estimator for estimating selection models
(1976, 1979).
Figure 3: Decision Tree for participation in the sample (GIHS, 2013)
Total sample
Did not answer Answered
Did not use
social networks
Used
social networks
Source: Authors.
First, we have determined a dummy variable “Answer” to capture
the answering individual decision, that takes the value 1 if the in-
dividual answered and 0 otherwise. Indeed, the dependent variable
(QoE index) is observed only for those individuals whose variable of
answering is superior to 0. Second, we have estimated the probability
of response with a Probit model. In this way, we explain the values of
“Answer” in terms of explanatory variables to estimate the probability
that Answer = 1. Third, after the Probit model estimation we have
estimated the Inverse Mills Ratio (λ) for each individual.11 Finally, we
have inserted this correction factor in the Finite Mixture Regression
Model.
C1: QoE1i = β
1
0 + SNW
1
i β
1
1 +X
1
i β
1
2 + λ
1
i + 
1
i
C2: QoE2i = β
2
0 + SNW
2
i β
2
1 +X
1
i β
2
2 + λ
2
i + 
2
i
 (5)
11In the selection step, we include an inferior number of explanatory variables
than the determination step in each model.
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The endogeneity between the QoE index and the use of ties could be
another major issue. However, within the GIHS (2013), we capture
the use of networks with an ex ante variable12, while the measure of
our QoE index is calculated from ex post variables (Appendix A1).
Thus, SNW captures a retardation behavior before the current occu-
pational status, and finally we do not meet endogeneity problem with
our variable of interest.
Stage 3: EM algorithm and maximization of the likelihood function
The EM algorithm, originally developed by Dempster et al. (1977),
is an iterative algorithm of calculating the maximum likelihood. It
is based on the central result that the parameter that maximizes the
predicted log-likelihood increases the logarithm of the observed likeli-
hood. In the first step, expectation-step, we calculate the expectation
of the log-likelihood for the current value of the parameters. In the
second step, maximization-step, parameters updates are performed by
maximizing this new function of these parameters. Finally, the algo-
rithm converges under assumptions of regularity to a stationary point.
4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
The distribution of QoE index clearly shows two different modes (Fig-
ure 4), proving a polarization in quality of employment in Bogota and
12In the GIHS, the question P6480 is: “How did you find your current job?” the
workers answer the means by which they obtained their current job.
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structuring two groups of QoE. On the left side, the first mode rep-
resents a “poor” quality of employment for precarious and vulnerable
workers and on the right side, the second mode shows a “strong” qual-
ity of employment group, benefiting from social and lawful protection.
Confirming Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016), results demonstrate
that it is more relevant to treat the break between good and bad jobs
rather than analyzing status typology (Bocquier et al. 2010). Indeed,
Appendix C1 shows that the distinction between employees and inde-
pendents is not a relevant proxy of the quality of employment in the
specific social context of Bogota’s labor market.
Figure 4: QoE index and QoE index by using ties to get a job, GIHS (2013)
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Source: Authors.
Furthermore, Appendix B1 shows the averages of all variables used
to study Bogota’s labor market. Selection bias exists between the total
sample and the subsample corresponding to those who answered the
social network question. We observe that this selection bias in the de-
pendent variable seems to be correlated with employment status and
firm size. Summary statistics show that earnings and QoE index gap
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between subsamples is considerable: in fact, for the workers who an-
swered the network question and did not use ties, earnings were 37%
higher and QoE was 31% better than for the others (Appendix B1).
Generally, people who have used ties to get their current job are less
educated, less likely to be in upper strata (3, 4, 5 and 6), less likely to
have a personal car or to have a formal employment compared with
people who did not used social networks (Appendix B1). Following
Rogers and Verhove (1995:268), these observations illustrate that a
worker “[...] does not live directly in the total society, or even, in the
local community. The effective social environment of [the worker] is its
network of friends, neighbors, relatives and particular social institu-
tions. This is the primary social world.” In other words, the different
classes of workers in the labor market are constructed reference groups
affecting relational practices, social behaviors and labor market out-
comes.
However, Figure 4 and Appendix C1 show that the distribution of
the use of ties for all workers, employees and independents is more
complex. Indeed, among those who mobilized ties, we can observe a
clear distinction between two populations: (i) poor job quality workers
who have used ties to obtain a job and (ii) high job quality workers.
This inter-group heterogeneity illustrated by Figure 4 and Appendix
C1 justifies the use of FMRM in our estimation stage. We confirm
the relevance of our empirical strategy with the Quantile Regressions
(QR). Indeed, we take into account different percentiles in the QoE
index distribution, to test the stability of the FMRM estimations, as
robustness tests. In this way, we switch between a semi-parametric to
a non-parametric model with bootstrapped standard errors to compare
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with a robust standard deviation in the models of interest (Appendix
E3).
4.2 The differential effects of using ties
The first step in the estimation of FMRM is to determine the most
suitable number of components. Table 1 shows that the breakdown
of quality of employment into two segments is preferable than other
options across information criteria (smallest value). Unlike Salem and
Bensidoun (2012), the parameters can be clearly identified and we do
not experience the over-parametrized problem. Finally, the division
between low quality job workers and high quality job workers is rel-
evant for modeling the heterogeneity of the QoE index in Bogota’s
labor market.
Table 1: Model selection and number of components
AIC BIC*
2 Components 5724.04 5573.72
3 Components 6074.54 5847.32
4 Components 6180.30 5876.17
5 Components 6284.71 5903.67
Note: *We have used the sample size
adjusted BIC.
Source: Authors.
Table 2, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2 present the estimation re-
sults (FMRM and OLS) of the QoE index for the total sample, for
employees and independents separately. The first piece of information
to be gleaned from this results refers to the potential bias in the QoE
equation resulting from answering the question or not. Indeed, the
significance of the correction term (λ) for all specifications actually
suggests that unobserved characteristics of the populations in and out
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of the sample are fairly different in Bogota’s labor market, and thus
that the estimation of a FMRM without selection term would have
led to biased estimated coefficients. In the Probit estimations, we
observe a higher response probabilty for formal employees, formal in-
dependents, informal employees, workers in large firms rather than for
informal independents and self-employed workers (Appendix D1). Fi-
nally, these results show that the λ correction is necessary to capture
these differential probabilities of answering.
The estimated mixture model with two segments produced a distri-
bution of 44% of the total sample in low quality job situations and
56% in high quality job positions (Table 2). In Appendix E1 and
Appendix E2, we found that the estimated separate FMRM for em-
ployees and independents produced the same distributions, 44% of
individuals in low quality job situations and 56% in high quality job
positions. Each group has enough observations and the groups are
clearly enough separated to avoid the degeneration problem in our re-
sults13. In the first place, we provide results which compare estimates
generated by FMRM models with estimates derived from traditional
statistical analysis (OLS) (Table 2, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2).
To complete this comparison, we then provide results of the QR for
the same specification (Appendix E3).
In Table 2, OLS estimates show that the use of social networks low-
ers the QoE index (–9% in the total sample, –11.5% for independents
and –8% for employees) suggesting high significant difference between
workers who used ties and those who did not. However, these results
13With these specifications, our models did not converge in the local and instable
maximum.
24
contrast with the FMRM estimations.
Table 2: FMRM and OLS for QoE index (total sample), GIHS (2013)
FMRM OLS‡
Variable Component 1 Component 2
Social networks -0.138*** -0.008*** -0.091***
(0.016) (0.002) (0.005)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Gender -0.008 -0.002 -0.008
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
Strata 2 0.018* 0.020*** 0.041***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Strata 3 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.055***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.010)
Strata 4 0.098*** 0.030*** 0.081***
(0.020) (0.006) (0.013)
Married 0.030*** 0.009*** 0.023***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.007)
Apartment 0.010 0.007*** 0.011*
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
λ -0.132*** -0.070*** -0.265***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
σc 0.154 0.058
(0.005) (0.001)
pic
† 0.440 0.560
(0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.365*** 0.742*** 0.517***
(0.035) (0.012) (0.027)
Log likelihood 2905.02
Wald χ2 2252.19***
Adjusted R2 0.385
N 5846 5846
Note: For the FMRM, robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses and the model converges in 11 iterations. Regressions also
include activity sector dummies. The first component is the low
quality of employment range and inversely for the second com-
ponent.
†pic is the probability that an observation is in component c.
‡For the OLS estimation, robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. Each predictor was uncorrelated with the other predictors.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
Looking at the Table 2, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2, we clearly
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observe the differential effects of the use of ties for low and high qual-
ity job workers, between the QoE semi-parametric groups.14 Workers,
employees or independents in the first Component (low quality jobs)
experiment large statistically significant decreases in QoE index when
using ties. In a markedly different manner, participants in the second
Component (high quality jobs) had small statistically significant de-
creases in QoE index following the use of ties.
As shown previously, we found that using contacts to get a job has a
high negative effect (respectively –14% for all workers, –13% for em-
ployees and –8% for independents) on quality of employment of the
lower group, when comparing with formal means. This interesting
result, qualitatively explained in the next subsections, appears to be
robust. Indeed, with the same specification in QR, we observe that
the high negative effects in the first percentiles of the QoE index dis-
tribution (q10, q20 and q30, Appendix E3) are very consistent with
the first component results. In the same group, we observe that being
a woman has significant negative effect on QoE index for employ-
ees, confirming studies on gender gap in the Colombian labor market
(Hoyos et al. 2010). However, the same coefficient is non-significant
for independent women. This observation shows that potential dis-
crimination does not appear statistically in employment status, but
this does not mean that the discrimination does not occur. Indeed,
the discriminations suffered by independent women seem to be held
upstream from their participation in the labor market, particularly in
14To test the robustness of our results, we generated the bootstrapped standard
errors in the case of Quantile Regressions. We show that the negative effects
decrease and are robust along the QoE distribution (Appendix E3).
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the distribution of unpaid work in households (Alaniz and Gindling
2013). Also, Farné and Vergara (2015) show that, between 2002 and
2011 in Colombia, there has been an improvement in the quality of em-
ployment for women. They explain this progress by the low decrease
of domestic work duration, predominantly a female occupation. More-
over, like in the spatiality of social capital approaches (Ioannides and
Loury 2004), we have shown a positive effect of upper socioeconomic
area and married status on quality of employment for all workers in
the first component.
Inversely and surprisingly, we found that using contacts to get a job
has a very small but significant negative effect (between 0.5% and
1.5%) on the quality of employment of high quality job workers, in
comparison with the use of mediating resources to obtain a job. This
unexpected negative effect for this type of workers (Granovetter 1974,
Montgomery 1992, Jackson et al. 2017), seems to be robust with the
QR estimates. Indeed, Appendix E3 shows a relative stability in the
small negative effects for the last percentiles selected in the QoE index
distribution (q70, q80 and q90). In this group, we also saw that being
a woman has no effect. Conversely to other studies in DCs (Nordman
and Wolff 2009), this interesting result shows that women are close
to break the glass-celling on this specific segment in the Bogota’s la-
bor market, because they live in highest socioeconomic area and they
are better educated. We also found that upper socioeconomic strata
residency, married status and living in an apartment have a smaller
significant positive effect for workers in the second component than in
the first component.
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4.3 Necessity networks and bad quality job trap
The high negative significant and robust effects of using ties has an
interesting interpretation in this context of low quality job workers.
Two reasons appeared relevant during the focus groups interviews with
them.
First, past research has differentiated between strong ties–people that
we know well and with whom we interact frequently–and weak ties–
people that we know less well and with whom we interact less fre-
quently. The advantages of weak ties lie in their abilities to provide
timely access to non-redundant information and to influence employers
directly. In contrast, strong ties are associated with indirect influence
on employers through well-connected intermediaries (Yakubovitch 2005).
Finally, weak ties have been found to be more beneficial in accessing
new information and to be instrumental in finding new jobs (Granovet-
ter 1974; Montgomery 1992). The three focus groups of low quality
job workers highlights that these workers have used strong ties to ob-
tain their actual job and this can explain the large negative effect of
using contacts, which challenges Kramarz and Skans’ results (2014).
In this way, Gloria, a 47 year old woman living in strata 2, highlights
her expectations to improve her quality of life. She explains that she
contacted directly her strong friends in her neighborhood to find a
better job. They recommended her at their jobs, she finally obtained
a job but it was not better than the previous one. Harold, a 26 year
old man living in strata 3, found his last job through his father’s con-
tacts, but he had long working hours in a large firm. They created
a local union to negotiate better working conditions, but two months
28
after the beginning of the negotiations, Harold was fired without un-
employment allocations.
Second, we can explain the large negative effect through the homophily
in the social network of the low quality job workers. Homophily iso-
lates workers who present the same social characteristics from workers
with other social characteristics, which then limits the extent to which
individuals in one group hear about openings and opportunities known
to the other group (Jackson et al. 2017). In other words, workers ap-
pealing to contacts who are in a same social position, have a lower
probability to get high labor market outcomes than workers appealing
to contacts who are in better social positions. In the focus groups of
low quality job workers we find that they have rarely contacted parents
or strong friends in better positions than themselves because of trust
issues. Patricia, a 30 year old woman living in strata 2, has searched a
job through specialized web pages and professional contacts who were
in better social and occupational position. However, these means were
not fruitful: the lack of information from her relatives about her pref-
erences and background as well as the “inadaptation” of these websites
to her profile, made the job search difficult. She found a job through
close friends and family contacts in the same social position. Vanesa,
a woman who lives in strata 3, was fourth month unemployed making
it difficult to keep her living standards. She found her job through her
mother’s contacts with approximately the same social position than
herself. Finally, she found a job with lower responsibilities and the
same salary than the one before.
Finally, these qualitative results tend to confirm the model presented
in the Section 3 for the “poor” quality job workers. More generally,
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we found that strong and homophilic ties are simultaneously a unique
instrument of last resort and a negative resource to increase quality of
employment for these workers (Rogers and Verhove 1995). The focus
groups interviews display that for these type of workers ties are strong,
homophilic and also a necessary safety.
4.4 Are opportunity networks really appropriate to access high quality
jobs?
We observe quantitatively that the use of networks does almost not
affect the QoE index comparing with the use of formal means for
the high quality job workers. However, this effect is negative and al-
ways statistically significant for this group of workers as for the low
quality group. We can formulate some hypothesis to explain these
observations and we use the focus group interviews to conclude and
complement these results. First, to clarify this small effect we can
assume that protected workers could use different types of networks
(weak, professional and heterophilic ties) to obtain a job unlike vul-
nerable workers. Second, the negative effect of networks on the QoE
index in this group could be explained by two reasons: a social accep-
tation of worst working conditions in the short run (over-loyalty and
over-subordination effects), and because using ties over formal means
could send a bad signal on the labor market. Protected workers have
all the information and skills to obtain a job through intermediation
means but by choosing ties, they miss out on better opportunities.
Some studies show that the advantages of weak ties (low emotional
intensity and low frequency) is clear for high skilled workers (Gra-
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novetter 1974; Yakubovitch 2005). In contrast with what is said about
bad job workers, good job workers use weak ties more frequently be-
cause the latter are more beneficial in accessing novel information and
are instrumental in finding new jobs. In this way, the three focus
groups of high quality job workers highlight that a major part of them
have used weak ties to obtain their actual job and this can explain
the small negative effects comparing with formal means. Paula, a 26
year old woman living in strata 3, highlights that she found her last
job through a second degree contact. Indeed, she received informa-
tion from an uncle of a scholar friend who worked at the firm. She
was unsatisfied with this activity and decided to search for a new job.
During this period, she received a lot of job offers sent by her scholar
and professional contacts. Finally, she found her current job through a
scholar relative recommendation, where she has better responsibilities,
a higher salary and lower working time than in her last job. Camilo, a
28 year old man living in strata 4, explains that family members and
strong friends could not help him in the job search process. However,
a scholar friend recommended him to his contacts, but Camilo did not
know them. He explains that for him this network process appeared
“murky.” There seems to be a signal effect: people did not know each
other, but everyone in the network was trustworthy because they had
the same scholar background.
Conversely to what we said previously, we can explain the low negative
effect through the heterophily in the social network of high quality job
workers. In other words, workers appealing to contacts who are in a
better social position, have a higher probability to get better labor
market outcomes (Lin 2002). In the focus groups of good quality job
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workers, we find that they have always contacted friends or relatives
in a better position than themselves because their recommendations
have greater impact than those of others. Odys, a 55 year old woman
living in the strata 4, found clients through contacts with her man-
aging directors. She has an efficient professional network with people
in a better social position than her because of their influence and
offer of opportunities (Lin 2002). However, she sometimes accepted
lower working conditions in order to maintain this professional net-
work. Carlos, a 23 year old man who lives in strata 4, found his last
job in the Central Bank of Colombia. In this occupational position, he
had a strong professional network who sent him new job opportunities
by mail. Using this means, Carlos found a job opportunity at the
University. However, he did not apply directly, a professional contact
recommended him to a professor, who was the department director,
allowing him to obtain the job. However, in this new job, he accepted
worse working conditions than in the first one. He explained that he
needed to show his skills and his loyalty in the new occupational po-
sition, pending to transition towards better professional projections.
The over-subordination effect in the short run appears clearly in some
cases of this group.
We do not confirm the model offered in Section 3 for the good quality
job workers. Our results show a low negative and significant effect of
networks compared to formal means to obtain a job. During the focus
groups, we found that weak, professional and heterophilic ties clearly
constitute a better job channel, but they also generate over-loyalty
and subordination effect, explaining the negative effect (Rogers and
Verhove 1995).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the role of ties in the quality of the em-
ployment for workers in the Bogota’s labor market. Confirming Com-
barnous and Deguilhem (2016), results demonstrate the relevance of
treating the break between good and bad jobs rather than analyzing
status typology (Bocquier et al. 2010). We have shown that employ-
ees and independents can be found both in the high and low QoE
group. Thanks to our focus group-based qualitative approach, we ob-
serve some different types of social networks in terms of the strength
of ties and social resources embedded in the contacts.The focus groups
interviews confirm that for the low quality workers, the ties are strong,
homophilic and also a necessary safety. For high quality job workers,
our results precise the low negative and statistically significant effect
comparing with formal means to get a job. Confirming a part of the
sociological and economic literature, we demonstrate that weak, pro-
fessional and heterophilic ties constitute a good job channel for the
“good job” workers. However, these type of ties also generate over-
loyalty and over-subordination effect, explaining why social networks
also have a negative effect on the QoE index for these workers (Rogers
and Verhove 1995).
In this paper, given the limited number of variables in the GIHS, we
had no opportunity to control precisely the cognitive and non-cognitive
skills of workers (it is just proxied by years of schooling). Indeed, we
could think that the differential negative effects of relational factor
on the QoE index is influenced also by cognitive abilities and by non-
cognitive skills (Heckman et al. 2006) of workers. Furthermore, we
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think that geography impacts the use of the social networks to get a
job (Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004; Jackson et al. 2017). How-
ever, we only use the socioeconomic strata of each worker since no
other geographical factor could be identified in the survey. Finally,
we are limited by the fact that answering the question about social
networks is incomplete in the GIHS. This question allows us to dis-
tinguish between formal and informal means or mediating resources,
but we have been unable to explore statistically the strength of ties,
the structural dimensions of networks and the contacts’ attributes.
Indeed, the main questions remains: how can we explain these differ-
ential negative effects between workers? can this difference come from
distinct kinds of ties? In our case, we must develop a more system-
atical approach than focus groups interviews to explore precisely the
information about social ties. In this way, we are presently workin on
a Bogota’s workers survey to produce quantitative data on the follow-
ing four crucial elements (contents embedded in the ties, structures
of social networks, contact attributes or resources and accessible so-
cial capital) and develop a networks analysis (Berrou and Combarnous
2011, 2012; Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer 2015).
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Appendix A1
Table 3: Indicators of the QoE index (GIHS, 2013)
Indicators Characterizations
Income 1 if individual earns less than the minimum wage (MW); 2 if individual earns
less than 2 MW; 3 if individual earns less than 4 MW; 4 if individual earns
more than 4 MW
Stability 1 if more than 1 year; 2 if not
Contract completeness See the note under the table
Other activity 1 if yes; 2 if not
Workplace 1 if individual works in hard local; 2 if household work; 3 if other
Transport 1 if individual has transport benefits; 2 if not
Time 1 if individual works less than 24 hours per week; 2 if he works between 24
and 48 hours per week (legal employment); 3 if he works more than 48 hours
per week
Social security 1 if individual contributes to social security; 2 if he has special social security
(Army, Ecopetrol, Public University); 3 if he has subsidized social security; 4
if not
Occupation risk 1 if individual has an occupation protection; 2 if not
Pension 1 if individual has a pension; 2 if not
Family fund 1 if individual has a family protection system; 2 if not
Union 1 if he is in a union; 2 if not
Subjectivity See the note under the table
Note: The Contract completeness indicator is a scoring variable constructed from seven variables of contract
composition. Category 0 illustrates the situation of workers without any forms of contract; category 1
identifies the primary elements of formal contract. Category 2 marks the passage to a written contract, but
contents of which remain rather weak. Category 3 marks the appearance of social contents in contracts, 4
and 5 are complete contracts. We do not presume the importance of every category, of this fact weighting
method is not necessary. The Subjectivity indicator constitutes an objective indicator of the subjective
representations. Like the QoE index, this variable is a synthesis constructed across MCA from eight
variables expressing the necessity of change and the satisfaction of workers. The first factorial axis explaining
more than 88% of the corrected eigenvalues (Greenacre 1993), it can be defined as the factor of workers?
satisfaction. After analysis of distribution, we have discretized this quantitative variable in three groups: 1
is a good satisfaction level and a will to stay in current job, 2 is an intermediate satisfaction level and 3 a
dissatisfaction level.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics, GIHS (2013)
Total Sample Answer Social Networks
Variable Yes No Yes No
QoE index* 0.508 0.6214 0.2879 0.5592 0.7365
Sd. (0.280) (0.258) (0.169) (0.273) (0.178)
Income* (per hour) 6117.51 5926.31 6488.98 5243.93 7187.99
Sd. (9433.73) (7918.46) (11828.26) (6943.69) (9331.15)
Age (years) 45.75 44.78 47.63 44.75 44.84
Sd. (14.67) (14.55) (14.73) (14.50) (14.64)
Education* (years) 9.997 10.09 9.82 9.60 10.98
Sd. (4.90) (4.82) (5.04) (4.73) (4.85)
Gender (%) 35.20 36.08 33.50 35.66 36.84
Strata 1 (%) 11.78 11.60 12.13 11.89 11.06
Strata 2 (%) 43.22 44.44 40.84 45.97 41.62
Strata 3 (%) 34.40 33.73 35.69 32.50 36.01
Strata 4†(%) 10.60 10.23 11.33 9.65 11.31
Married (%) 28.20 28.02 28.55 27.28 29.39
Personal car (%) 21.76 20.87 23.50 19.74 22.95
Formal employee (%) 47.76 68.30 7.84 65.26 73.93
Formal independent (%) 16.65 18.59 12.86 16.84 21.83
Informal employee (%) 9.73 5.42 18.11 6.59 3.27
Informal independent (%) 25.86 7.68 61.18 11.31 0.97
Self-employed (%) 23.88 5.80 59.02 8.59 0.63
2-5 employees (%) 19.41 18.66 20.87 25.88 5.31
6-10 employees (%) 7.19 8.40 4.85 10.25 4.97
11-50 employees (%) 11.97 15.45 5.22 17.32 11.99
51-100 employees (%) 3.77 5.20 1.00 4.69 6.14
More than 100 (%) 33.77 46.49 9.04 33.26 70.96
Manufacturing (%) 15.39 16.63 12.99 16.70 16.47
Commercial services (%) 20.84 17.19 27.92 18.90 14.04
Transport (%) 8.24 8.18 8.37 8.17 8.19
Finance (%) 17.56 18.73 15.29 16.39 23.05
Household (%) 9.73 9.80 9.60 13.31 3.31
Hotels and rest (%) 6.47 7.63 4.22 8.80 5.46
Public (%) 3.94 4.53 2.79 2.21 8.82
Education (%) 5.33 6.11 3.82 3.82 10.33
Social and medical (%) 6.38 5.23 8.61 4.35 6.87
Apartment (%) 67.24 67.98 65.80 66.50 70.71
Property owner (%) 31.58 30.36 33.93 29.44 32.07
Toilet user‡(%) 89.65 89.65 89.66 88.16 92.40
Cable or satellite TV (%) 80.68 81.70 78.70 80.97 83.04
People per household (average) 3.36 3.45 3.19 3.50 3.37
Sd. (1.57) (1.56) (1.59) (1.57) (1.52)
Obs. 8855 5846 3009 3794 2052
Note: *Means are statically different at 1% level. †Strata 4 aggregates the stratas 4, 5 and 6. ‡Toilet
user is a binary variable coded “Yes” if people from the household are exclusive users of the toilets.
Source: Authors.
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Figure 5: QoE index for independents and employees, GIHS (2013)
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Table 5: Marginal effects on the probability of answering, GIHS (2013)
Variable Probit(1) Probit(2) Probit(3)
Education -0.010*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.001)
Age -0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) -0.001** (0.000)
Gender -0.000 (0.013) -0.066*** (0.019) 0.028*** (0.009)
Formal employee 0.544*** (0.015) 0.392*** (0.024)
Formal independent 0.189*** (0.018) 0.999*** (0.000)
Informal employee 0.125*** (0.016)
2-5 employees 0.290*** (0.011) 0.512*** (0.023) 0.085*** (0.008)
6-10 employees 0.250*** (0.011) -0.437*** (0.012) 0.091*** (0.006)
11-50 employees 0.289*** (0.010) -0.485*** (0.013) 0.103*** (0.007)
51-100 employees 0.277*** (0.008) -0.356*** (0.011) 0.0092*** (0.006)
More than 100 0.422*** (0.015) -0.707*** (0.015) 0.197*** (0.013)
TV -0.024 (0.015) 0.005 (0.024) -0.030*** (0.010)
People 0.024*** (0.004) 0.087*** (0.006) -0.023*** (0.003)
Car -0.008 (0.016) 0.032 (0.023) -0.033** (0.014)
Owner -0.015 (0.015) 0.042* (0.022) 0.005 (0.011)
Log likelihood -3035.71 -1573.17 -1246.31
χ2 5279.06*** 1943.73*** 1871.12***
Pseudo R2 0.465 0.382 0.429
N 8855 3764 5091
Note: The first model treats all sample, the second treats only the independents and the
third only the employees. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
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Table 6: FMRM and OLS for QoE index (independents), GIHS (2013)
FMRM OLS‡
Variable Component 1 Component 2
Social networks -0.081*** -0.016*** -0.114***
(0.026) (0.005) (0.011)
Age -0.006** 0.001 -0.004
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender 0.017 -0.003 0.034**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013)
Strata 2 0.037** 0.027*** 0.051***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021)
Strata 3 0.039** 0.038*** 0.060***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010)
Strata 4 0.118*** 0.050*** 0.140***
(0.039) (0.012) (0.026)
Married 0.027** 0.010* 0.020
(0.012) (0.003) (0.013)
Apartment 0.007 0.006 0.017
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
λ -0.093*** -0.061*** -0.287***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018)
σc 0.108 0.069
(0.009) (0.003)
pic
† 0.404 0.596
(0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.458*** 0.725*** 0.727***
(0.073) (0.033) (0.067)
Log likelihood 680.96
Wald χ2 341.16***
Adjusted R2 0.408
N 1536 1536
Note: For the FMRM, robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses and the model converges in 17 iterations. Regressions also
include activity sector dummies. The first component is the low
quality of employment range and inversely for the second com-
ponent.
†pic is the probability that an observation is in component c.
‡For the OLS estimation, robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. Each predictor was uncorrelated with the other predictors.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
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Table 7: FMRM and OLS for QoE index (employees), GIHS (2013)
FMRM OLS‡
Variable Component 1 Component 2
Social networks -0.132*** -0.005*** -0.079***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.006)
Age 0.003* 0.001* 0.003**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Gender -0.024*** -0.005* -0.023***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Strata 2 0.003 0.015** 0.037***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.011)
Strata 3 0.026* 0.020*** 0.049***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.011)
Strata 4 0.081*** 0.023*** 0.061***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.014)
Married 0.027** 0.010*** 0.028***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.008)
Apartment 0.012 0.007** 0.013*
(0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
λ -0.224*** -0.152*** -0.462***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.019)
σc 0.159 0.055
(0.004) (0.001)
pic
† 0.438 0.562
(0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.350*** 0.741*** 0.504***
(0.040) (0.012) (0.030)
Log likelihood 2317.21
Wald χ2 2274.36***
Adjusted R2 0.405
N 4310 4310
Note: For the FMRM, robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses and the model converges in 11 iterations. Regressions also
include activity sector dummies. The first component is the low
quality of employment range and inversely for the second com-
ponent.
†pic is the probability that an observation is in component c.
‡For the OLS estimation, robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. Each predictor was uncorrelated with the other predictors.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
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Table 8: Quantile Regressions (total sample), GIHS (2013)
QR
Variable q10 q20 q30 q70 q80 q90
Social networks -0.136*** -0.163*** -0.119*** -0.026*** -0.018*** -0.012***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.283 0.327 0.134 0.100 0.066
N 5846 5846 5846 5846 5846 5846
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses (500 rep.).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
Table 9: Quantile Regressions (independents), GIHS (2013)
QR
Variable q10 q20 q30 q70 q80 q90
Social networks -0.148*** -0.207*** -0.181*** -0.055*** -0.032*** -0.029***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.026) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.270 0.332 0.160 0.116 0.082
N 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses (500 rep.).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
Table 10: Quantile Regressions (employees), GIHS (2013)
QR
Variable q10 q20 q30 q70 q80 q90
Social networks -0.134*** -0.152*** -0.093*** -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.008***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.306 0.341 0.155 0.122 0.086
N 4310 4310 4310 4310 4310 4310
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses (500 rep.).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
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